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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6471
INFO RUEHKK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 5791
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0176
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0167
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0595
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0802
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0564
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0927
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0530
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0155
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0040
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0649

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 000410

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TAGS: [NP](#) [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [SY](#)

SUBJECT: ITALIAN/G-8 DEMARCHE TO SARG ON IAEA REPORT

Classified By: CDA Maura Connelly for reasons 1.4 b and d.

11. (C) Summary: The Italian Ambassador informed us June 3 that he delivered a demarche in his capacity as G-8 representative on the latest IAEA report regarding Syria. The Ambassador wrote encouraging the Syrians to sign the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), citing the high risk of proliferation in the region. Without agreeing to sign the Additional Protocol, Syrian officials responded saying they are committed to the rules of the NPT, that they call on Israel to sign the NPT as well, and that signing the Additional Protocol remains voluntary. This reflects no change in Syria's stance on the Additional Protocol. End Summary

12. (C) Points for G-8 demarche on the IAEA Additional Protocol
General points

- The risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons represents a serious challenge to our global security. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the international nuclear safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are fundamental pillars of the international non-proliferation regime.
- It is important that all NPT parties adopt the highest standards for IAEA safeguards by adopting the Additional Protocol. The action will give the IAEA the critical tools it needs to monitor effectively the non-proliferation commitments embodied in the NPT. The Group of Eight (G-8) is committed to universalizing the Additional Protocol. All G-8 members have ratified the Additional Protocol as well as a majority of IAEA members.
- Since 2001, the G-8 has been pursuing efforts to strengthen international and multilateral mechanisms to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction, including their possible acquisition by terrorist groups.
- In particular, we call attention to the G-8 Hokkaido-Toyako Summit Leaders Declaration of 2008, which states: "We further stress the importance of...strengthening the IAEA safeguards and the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol."
- This initiative is a part of efforts aimed at strengthening the NPT and IAEA verification system.
- Your country (Syria) is a party to the NPT. You have agreed not to acquire or seek assistance in producing nuclear weapons, and in doing so you have helped make the NPT the

most widely accepted treaty controlling nuclear weapons.

- It is important for all NPT parties to work together to strengthen the NPT and ensure that it continues to advance our common security interests.
- We also note that the United Nations Security Council approved resolution 1540 in April 2004. This resolution identifies nuclear proliferation as a threat to international peace and security, and calls on states to adopt and enforce effective laws to prohibit efforts by non-state actors to acquire nuclear weapons.
- Implementation of the IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol, is one important way you can contribute to this effort, by making it harder for nuclear material and equipment to fall into the wrong hands.

Points on the Additional Protocol

- One critical step is to adopt the highest standards for verifying your non-proliferation commitments by accepting the IAEA's strengthened safeguards system, which will enable the IAEA to draw conclusions with greater confidence.
- In 1997 the IAEA Board of Governors adopted the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540). This is a model for agreements between states and the IAEA that would provide a strengthened safeguard system and grant the IAEA the necessary expanded right of access to information and sites. A principal aim is to build confidence that states are abiding by their international commitments.
- According to the IAEA Director General El Baradei's definition, the Additional Protocol is the "sine qua non" of

DAMASCUS 00000410 002 OF 002

effective verification. Without it, the IAEA cannot fully meet the expectations of the international community that it provide an assurance that states are meeting their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

- Universal adoption of the Additional Protocol is in the interest of the whole international community.
- That is why the G-8 and the European Union are committed to making the Additional Protocol the universal standard.
- We urge you to sign the Protocol as soon as possible and promptly complete the steps necessary under your national legislation to bring it into force.
- The G-8 stands ready to provide any assistance you may need as you undertake this important responsibility.

CONNELLY